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hil Strahan and various coauthors have
written a series of significant papers on the
impact of interstate banking and intrastate
branching deregulation. His present paper summa-
rizes and extends much of that research.1
I suspect that most economists would agree
that draconian restrictions on branch banking or
on the ability of bank holding companies to cross
state lines make no sense. Geographic restrictions
historically left the U.S. banking system vulnerable
to regional economic shocks, limited banks’ ability
to exploit economies of scale and scope, sheltered
weak banks from competition, and imposed costs
on the consumers of banking services. Strahan’s
work attempts to quantify the impact of the removal
of such restrictions on economic growth and entre-
preneurial activity at the state level. His estimates
are striking—for example, the removal of restrictions
on branching appears to have increased the growth
rate of state per capita incomes by about one-third,
and the effect is persistent. He also estimates a
marked increase in the rate of new business incor-
porations following deregulation, as well as a large
decline in the volatility of state-level business cycles
after interstate banking was permitted.
Economists and economic historians have long
debated the effects of a country’s financial system
on its economic development. This commentary
relates Strahan (2003) to other studies on the effects
of geographic restrictions on banks, with a focus
on historical comparisons. In addition, I raise some
specific questions about Strahan’s empirical analysis
in the traditional discussant’s role as devil’s advocate.
DOES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE MATTER? 
Richard Sylla (1998) argues that, between 1780
and 1820, the emergence of a financial system
characterized by strong commercial banks, a deep
capital market, and a sound currency set the United
States apart from its Western Hemisphere neighbors
and helps explain why the United States experienced
rapid economic growth when other countries did
not. Although commercial banks and securities
markets did not arise or develop independently of
one another, the degree of separation between the
two and the importance of securities markets in
the United States was unlike the financial systems
of continental European countries, where banks
dominated and securities markets were bit players. 
The failure of powerful universal banks to
emerge in the United States—and by extension,
the reason why the U.S. capital market became so
important—was the result, Calomiris (1995) argues,
of restrictions on the ability of commercial banks
to operate branches.2 Calomiris argues that universal
banks enjoy economies of scope by combining
deposit-taking, trust services, lending, equity-holding,
and underwriting. Hence, universal banks are
uniquely able to meet the changing financial needs
of corporations as they mature and, thus, provide
an efficient means of financing a nation’s economic
development. In the United States, Calomiris claims,
branching restrictions made it difficult for commer-
cial banks to grow sufficiently in size to meet the
financial needs of large-scale enterprises, and,
consequently, he argues that the cost of capital was
higher in the United States than it would have been
with a system of universal banks with nationwide
offices (such as in the German banking system).
2 With the exceptions of the First and Second Bank of the United States,
which were federally chartered and operated offices throughout the
country, before the Civil War all U.S. banks were chartered by state
governments. A few southern states permitted banks to branch, but
most states did not; furthermore, state-chartered banks were never
permitted to operate branches across state lines. The charters of both
the First and Second Banks were both allowed to expire after 20 years
of operation, and no bank operated interstate branches after 1836.
The National Bank Act of 1863, which established the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and provided for federal bank chartering,
was interpreted as prohibiting interstate branching. The McFadden
Act of 1927 further restricted branching by national banks.
1 See Strahan (2003) for references.
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STABLE?
Calomiris’s (1995) contention—that branching
restrictions increased the cost of capital in the United
States and, presumably, held back the rate of econ-
omic growth—is difficult to test and not universally
agreed upon (e.g., see Fohlin, 1998). Much more
widely accepted is the view that branching restric-
tions were an important cause of instability in the
U.S. banking system. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
contend that branching restrictions left the U.S.
banking system especially vulnerable to banking
panics, such as those occurring during the Great
Depression. Canada, by contrast, had a banking
system consisting of a small number of large banks
with nationwide branches and suffered no banking
panics during the Depression. Grossman (1994) also
finds that panics were less likely to occur during
the Depression in countries that had nationwide
branch banking.
Within the United States, Wheelock (1995) and
Mitchener (2002) find that during the Depression
bank failure rates were lower in states that permitted
some branching. Interestingly, Calomiris and Mason
(2000) and Carlson (2001) find that branching
increased the probability of failure for individual
banks, controlling for bank size and other specific
characteristics. Both Calomiris and Mason (2000)
and Carlson and Mitchener (2002) suggest that prior
acquisitions by branching banks might explain why
branching seems to have increased the probability
of failure for individual banks while average failure
rates were lower in states that permitted branching.
Calomiris and Mason (2000) note that some branch-
ing banks had engaged aggressively in acquisitions
during the late 1920s, and the estimated positive
effect of branching on the probability of failure for
individual banks during the 1930s might reflect the
costs of acquiring distressed banks in prior years. 
Carlson and Mitchener (2002) conclude that the
expansion of branching during the 1920s increased
competition and drove out of existence many weak
banks in formerly protected markets either by failure,
voluntary liquidation, or merger. Hence, once the
Depression hit, the average bank—regardless of
whether it had branches—was stronger in states
that permitted branching than in other states, result-
ing in a lower state bank failure rate. Carlson (2001)
finds that branching banks tended to maintain lower
reserve ratios than other banks, however, which
might explain why branching appears to have
increased the probability of failure for individual
banks.
THE EFFICIENCY OF BRANCH BANKING
SYSTEMS
Although banking systems that consist of a small
number of large banks with nationwide branches
have been more stable historically, the question
arises whether such systems are efficient. Although
Strahan (2003) finds that deregulation has not
increased bank market concentration in the United
States, many countries that permit nationwide
branching have highly concentrated banking systems.
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that increasing
market concentration raises the cost of bank loans for
firms and retards economic growth. Bordo, Redish,
and Rockhoff (1995), however, find that interest rates
on loans between 1920 and 1980 were not higher in
Canada, which has a highly concentrated banking
system, than in the United States. They also find
that interest rates paid on deposits were higher in
Canada. Although Canadian banks had a higher
average rate of return on equity than U.S. banks,
Bordo, Redish, and Rockhoff (1995) attribute this to
scale economies and the Canadian system’s stability
rather than to the exercise of monopoly power.
Although Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and
other studies have investigated the effects of bank
market concentration on economic growth, I am not
aware of any studies other than Strahan’s work that
directly test the effects that branching, per se, or
changes in branching laws have on growth. Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) note that, although Canada
had no banking panics, the percentage declines in
Canadian and U.S. gross domestic product (GDP)
during the Depression were similar. Moreover, U.S.
states that permitted branch banking seem not to
have fared any better during the Depression than
did other states. These studies focus on a short and
unusual period, however, and provide little evidence
of the impact of branching in general. Strahan’s
studies of the real economic effects of intrastate
branching and interstate banking deregulation are
thus unique and important.
SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON STRAHAN
(2003)
Strahan’s (2003) estimates of the impact of
deregulation on economic growth are large: He finds
that removing restrictions on statewide branching
increased the average growth rate of state real per
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growth remained as high five years after deregula-
tion. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) investigate the
determinants of deregulation and conclude that
technological changes created strong pressure for
deregulation, while the timing of deregulation in spe-
cific states was determined by the relative strengths
of pro- and anti-deregulation constituents. Impor-
tantly, they find no evidence that deregulation
occurred in anticipation of future economic growth.
Freeman (2002), however, shows that states tended
to deregulate when they were growing below trend,
suggesting that the choice of branching regime was
not independent of income growth. Freeman shows
further that when three- or five-year intervals sur-
rounding the year of deregulation are eliminated
from the estimation of Strahan’s model, the esti-
mated impact of the removal of intrastate branching
restrictions on growth is smaller than what Strahan
reports.
A correlation between deregulation and state
per capita income growth is evident in Figures 1
through 3. Figures 1 and 2 show the dates when
states removed restrictions on intrastate branching
and interstate banking. In Figure 1, states that are
not shaded include those permitting statewide
branching before 1976 (the first year in Strahan’s,
2003, empirical analysis), plus Delaware and South
Dakota, which Strahan excludes.3 Other states are
shaded in groups according to when they enabled
statewide branching. In Figure 3, states are shaded
according to annual average growth in state per
capita income during 1976-96, the years encom-
passed by Strahan’s empirical work. By comparing
the three maps, one notes that average growth
tended to be higher in states that deregulated earlier.
One also notes regional patterns in the timing of
deregulation and average growth rates. States in the
South and New England tended to deregulate earlier
than Midwestern states, and several of these had
among the highest average annual growth rates. 
The regional patterns in the timing of deregula-
tion and growth rates suggest possible spatial cor-
relation among either or both variables. Spatial
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3 Delaware and South Dakota are are omitted because the presence of
several large credit-card banks in each state distorts banking and growth
data. These states are not shaded in Figure 2 for the same reason.
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Figure 3correlation arises if, say, the decision of one state
to adopt a particular branching law is affected by
another state’s choice. Or, it would arise if the growth
rate of one state is affected by the growth rate of
another state. In the former case, an independent
variable in Strahan’s (2003) model would exhibit
spatial correlation. In the latter case, the dependent
variable would exhibit spatial correlation. Failure
to account for spatial correlation in an independent
variable will result in inefficient coefficient estimates.
Failure to account for spatial correlation in a depen-
dent variable, however, can lead to biased estimates.4
Observed regional patterns do not necessarily mean
that variables are spatially correlated, but do suggest
the need for additional testing.
The removal of intrastate branching and inter-
state banking restrictions in the United States pro-
vided a natural experiment of the effects of changes
in banking market structure on real economic
activity. Strahan’s comprehensive analysis shows
that deregulation had significant positive effects on
economic activity. Although additional econometric
work might reduce the magnitude of the effects he
finds, Strahan’s work will remain important as a
comprehensive analysis of the causes and effects
of banking deregulation.
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